Freedman and Eraser's (1966) suggestion that self-percept may affect the likelihood that individuals will act on an attitude was investigated. The probability of subjects' complying with Experimenter 2's request to distribute anti-air-pollution leaflets was assessed following Experimenter 1's manipulation of high or low payment ($1.50 or $10) and feedback to subjects indicating they (a) had a "doer" personality which entitled them to this payment (doer self-percept-inequity) ; (6) had a "doer" personality, but were entitled to this payment because of their performance on an experimental task (doer self-percept-no inequity); or (c) were entitled to this payment because of their task performance (no doer self-percept-no inequity). The probability of compliance was greater for high-than low-payment subjects (p < .05), and greater for subjects who were told that payment was contingent upon their personality than for those in other feedback conditions (p < .01). Although both inequity motivation and the self-percept manipulation were necessary to increase the likelihood of subjects' acting on an attitude, the present results are consistent with Freedman and Eraser's suggestion. They also tend to support some inequity theory assumptions employed in the experimental manipulations.
Although a great deal of attention has been given to attitudes and attitude change, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the relationship between attitudes and behavior. 3 Yet this is certainly an important area of study, not only theoretically but also practically, for there is a growing demand being placed on the discipline of psychology to contribute to the solution of social problems. In a time fraught with violence, we need to understand the causes of aggression so as to prevent it; in a nation marked by racism, we must understand the genesis of attitudes so as to change them. Equally important to the institution of social change is an under-1 This research was conducted while the first author was on a National Institute of Mental Health predoctoral fellowship. The study received support from National Science Foundation Grant GS-737 to the second author.
2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Leslie Ann McArthur, Department of Psychology, Yale University, 333 Cedar Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06519.
3 Festinger (1964) considered the question of behavior change following from attitude change. In an intensive search of the attitude change literature, he found only three studies relevant to this issue and none of these (Fleishman, Harris, & Burtt, 1955; Jam's & Feshbach, 1953; Maccoby, Romney, Adams, & Maccoby, 1962) contained evidence for behavior change following from attitude change. standing of the relationship between beliefs and behavior, for only through such understanding can we replace apathy toward social problems with constructive action.
Some research has demonstrated a positive relationship between attitudes and behavior. De Fleur and Westie (1958) found an attitude measure of prejudice to be a good predictor of subjects' willingness to be photographed with a Negro and to sign an authorization permitting wide use of the photograph. Nettler and Golding (1946) found that items of a Thurstone scale on attitudes toward the Japanese discriminated between members of avidly pro-and anti-Japanese organizations. In contrast to these data, a lack of correspondence between attitude and behavior has been reported by other authors. La Piere (1934) found that motel or restaurant proprietors served a Chinese couple although they said they would not when asked by letter. And Minard (19S2) observed differences in patterns of racial behavior during working hours and leisure time, reflecting apparent inconsistencies between attitudes and behavior, These disparate findings have one property in common. They all represent correlations of behavior with a broad range of attitudes rather than cause and effect relationships. Since one's attitude is only a single factor among many which can affect overt behavior, it is not surprising that inconsistencies obtain when attitudes and relevant behavior are correlated, // the appropriate behavioral index were employed and "extraneous" factors held constant, attitude would probably prove to be an excellent predictor of behavior. But, it is nonetheless clear that "all of the people don't act on all of their attitudes all of the time." (This indeterminate relationship between attitude and behavior is depicted by the dotted line in Figure 1 .) The present research is concerned with this phenomenon. Rather than asking, "Do people act in accordance with existing attitudes," as past investigators have done, the question is raised, "Under what conditions do people act on existing attitudes?" More specifically, what factors will increase or decrease the likelihood that individuals will take action on an attitude, when attitude per se is held constant? Freedman and Fraser (1966) suggested that one's self-perception may be a crucial factor in producing action on attitudes. They found that compliance with a request to take some minor action on an issue increased the probability that an individual would subsequently comply with a larger request, even when the two requests concerned different attitudes and involved qualitatively different behaviors. In attempting to explain this increase in compliance, Freedman and Fraser (1966) This interpretation suggests that at least under some conditions, a two-way relationship between self-perception and behavior may be operative. This relationship is represented by the broken line in Figure 1 , illustrating how feedback from behavior influences selfpercept, which, in turn, affects subsequent action on attitudes. The present study was designed to test directly the second phase of this process-that perceiving oneself to be the kind of person who takes action on things he believes in (a "doer") will increase the probability of complying with a request to act on an attitude. To investigate this relationship, feedback from the experimenter (as opposed to feedback from past behavior) was used to influence subjects' self-percepts.
While informing someone that he is a "doer" may be one of the necessary conditions for producing action on attitudes, it is possibly not sufficient. In Freedman and Eraser's study, subjects had committed themselves to taking action on their attitudes by complying with the first request, In addition to creating a "doer" self-percept, this initial action may have provided some motivation toward consistency in responding to the second request. This possibility is represented in Figure 1 by the direct connection between feedback from behavior and an activated doer self-percept. Additional evidence that a motivational component may be necessary to implement action on an attitude is offered in a study by Marlowe, Frager, and Nuttall (196S) . Subjects who had been deprived of an opportunity to earn $20 because they had favorable attitudes toward Negroes were more likely to volunteer to guide visiting Negroes around the campus than were subjects with similar attitudes who had been deprived of $1.50. This difference was not maintained when subjects lost the money by chance rather than because of their attitudes. The authors concluded that in order to minimize the discomfort experienced, an individual who suffers for his beliefs will justify them by engaging in relevant behavior. The same behavior is less probable for individuals who have similar beliefs, but who feel no need to justify them.
Since a doer self-percept may not by itself be sufficient to increase the probability of acting on an attitude, the present study employed a motivational component--inequity •-in conjunction with the self-percept manipulation to produce an activated doer selfpercept for one group of subjects. The theory of inequity (Adams, 1965) holds that in an exchange situation, as between employer and employee, if an individual's inputs (e.g., skill, experience) are not equivalent to his outcomes (e.g., remuneration, promotion), an unpleasant state of imbalance-inequity-will result. That is to say, an individual will be disturbed if he "reaps more (or less) than he sows." Behavior directed toward adjusting the inputs and outcomes so that they are equivalent is expected to follow. More specifically, it has been found (Adams, 1963; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; Arrowood, 1961) that an individual who perceives he is overpaid, relative to his inputs, will attempt to reduce the inequity he experiences by increasing relevant inputs. These findings were employed in the present study together with the follow- Implementation. The subject's implicit understanding of what constitutes an equitable or inequitable exchange was relied upon, and no one was explicitly told that his outcomes exceeded his inputs.
Assumption 2. If the individual who possesses an attribute (e.g., experience, skill, personality) does not recognize its existence, then it is not an input as far as he is concerned. Consequently, any outcome which is contingent upon it will produce inequity.
Implementation, Inequity was produced for one group of subjects by promising them payment for being "doers"-a personality input which they did not necessarily recognize in themselves. The remaining subjects were promised payment for a clearly recognized input-their task performance-and thus experienced no inequity.
Assumption 3. The magnitude of inequity experienced will be an increasing function of the size of the discrepancy between outcomes and inputs.
Implementation. The magnitude of inequity was varied by employing two levels of payment.
Conceptually, the present study may be regarded as an investigation of the strength of the relationship between attitude and behavior in the presence of each of the three intervening subject states depicted in Figure  1 : activated self-percept (loe ,., self-percept aoei , or no seIf-percept dOM .. Operationally, the present study assessed subjects' willingness to act on an expressed attitude following manipulation of either (a) a doer self-percept with inequity, (b) a doer self-percept without inequity, or (c) neither self-percept nor inequity. Self-percept was manipulated by means of false personality feedback from the experimenter such that acting on an attitude would be consistent with subjects' selfperception; inequity was manipulated vis-avis subjects' personality such that acting on an attitude would be a motivated new input relevant to the reduction of inequity. The following predictions were made:
1. Compared with subjects who are told that they are doers and paid for their task performance (doer-no inequity), subjects who are paid because they are doers (doer-inequity) will be more likely to act on an expressed attitude, since this behavior can reduce inequity by increasing relevant inputs.
2. Insofar as manipulation of an unactivated self-percept is by itself sufficient to augment action on an attitude, it is expected that subjects who are told that they are doers and paid for their task performance (doer-no inequity) will be more likely to act on an expressed attitude than subjects who are simply paid for their task performance (no doer-no inequity).
3. Magnitude of payment will have a greater effect on likelihood of acting on an attitude for those subjects who experience inequity, since inequity-and hence motivation to reduce it by increasing relevant inputs-is a direct function of the perceived discrepancy between inputs and outcomes.
METHOD Stibjects
Sixty-nine male undergraduates from the introductory psychology course at Yale University volunteered to participate in the study for experimental credit. Of these subjects, nine were eliminated from the data analysis: three because others had informed them of the deceptions involved in the experimental manipulations; four because they expressed suspicion about the manipulations; and two because they misunderstood the experimental manipulations.
Overview oj the Procedure
Sixty subjects were randomly assigned to one of three feedback conditions, corresponding to "inputs" in the terminology of inequity theory (doerinequity, doer-no inequity, or no doer-no inequity) and one of two payment conditions, corresponding to "outcomes" in inequity theory (1 hour experimental credit plus $1.50 or $10) to form a 2X3 factorial design. Following two bogus tasks administered by Experimenter 1, subjects were given false feedback concerning their performance and promised $1.50 (or $10) for participating in a future experiment. For doer-inequity subjects, the input relevant to this payment outcome was their doer personality, while their performance on the bogus tasks was an irrelevant input. For doer-no inequity subjects, performance on the tasks was the relevant input, while possession of doer personality traits was an irrelevant input. Performance was also the relevant input for no doer-no inequity subjects, who were given no feedback regarding their personalities. All subjects were subsequently asked to act on an expressed attitude (i.e., to be a doer) by passing out leaflets concerning the problem of air pollution.* This request was made by Experimenter 2 who was disassociated from the payment and its contingencies.
Independent Variables
All subjects were run individually by Experimenter 1 who administered two tasks. One of these was a multiple-choice embedded-figures test which ostensibly measured perceptual style, and the other consisted of the need achievement subscale from the Edwards (1953,) Personal Preference Schedule. Upon completion of these tests, subjects were given false feedback concerning their performance and offered the opportunity to participate in a paid experiment.
Doer-inequity (D-l) . Subjects in this condition were told that they were doers and payment was contingent upon this personality input. Hence, both self-percept and inequity were manipulated for this group. Feedback to subjects was as follows:
There are some personality variables which have been correlated with your performance on the two tests you took today. Maybe you'd be interested in hearing about them? Your performance indicates that you are very analytical and active, which means that you're good at figuring out what needs to be done and then doing it. Also you're aware of your role in society and you're independent enough to do your part no matter what others say. As a result, you're able to change your environment to make it what you think it should be. To sum it all up, you're a "doer"-because your attitudes lead you to action. As I mentioned before, this experiment is a pilot study for another experiment in which they need certain types of subjects. "Doers" like you is one type they're looking for. They really need people with personality traits like yours, so you'll be paid in addition to receiving subject credit.
At this point subjects were given a sign-up sheet which indicated that they would be given $1.50 (or $10) plus 1-hour experimental credit for their participation. This information was conveyed through written instruction so that Experimenter 1 would be unaware of subjects' payment condition, thus minimizing experimenter bias. The sign-up sheet also described the bogus experiment for which they were being recruited. It was presented as a 1-hour personality test to insure that subjects would not forsee an opportunity to reduce inequity by working hard, doing a good job, etc., in the experiment itself, but rather would perceive a "doer-personality" to be the only input they could offer to justify the outcome they had received.
Doer-no inequity (D-NI).
Subjects in this condition were told that they were "doers" but that payment was contingent upon their task performance rather than this personality characteristic. Hence, self-percept, but not inequity, was manipulated in this group which served as a control against which the effects of the inequity manipulation could be assessed. Feedback was essentially identical to that given D-I subjects except that the sequence and contingencies were varied. Subjects were first informed of the next experiment as follows:
This experiment is a pilot study for another experiment in which they need subjects who score in a particular way on both the perceptual task and the need achievement test. They're looking for a couple of patterns of scores and yours is one of them. They really need people with your pattern of scores so you'll be paid in addition to receiving subject credit.
After signing up for the bogus experiment, subjects were introduced to their "doer" personality traits as follows:
There are some personality variables which have been correlated with your performance on the two tests you took today. You didn't quality for the next experiment because of these personality traits. It's just your pattern of scores that they're interested in, but maybe you'd be interested in hearing about them anyway?
After thus making it clear to subjects that they qualified for the paid experiment because of their task performance, the doer personality traits were related to them. (See D-I.) A r o doer-no inequity (ND-N1). Subjects in this condition were told nothing about their personalities, and payment was contingent upon their task performance. Hence, neither inequity nor self-percept was manipulated for this group, which served as a control against which the effects of the self-percept manipulation could be assessed. Feedback to these subjects was identical to that given in the D-NI condition with the exception that no information regarding personality traits was given.
Following the experimental manipulations, all subjects filled out a questionnaire evaluating the experiment. This was actually a manipulation check, including indexes of subjects' mood, interest in the experiment, and reaction to the payment they had been promised. Upon completion of the questionnaire, subjects were thanked for their cooperation. The experimenter then recalled that there was a political science student (Experimenter 2) down the hall who had secured permission from the psychology department to use those subjects who completed psychology experiments in less than the alotted time. All subjects agreed to fill out a questionnaire for Experimenter 2, and Experimenter 1 directed them to him.
Dependent Variables
Procedure. After leaving Experimenter 1, subjects proceeded to an unmarked office at the end of the corridor where they were greeted by Experimenter 2, a confederate who was blind to independent variable manipulations. He identified himself as a graduate student in political science, and described the questionnaire as a public opinion survey which was part of his thesis. After subjects filled out this questionnaire (actually the I-E scale; see Footnote 4), they were asked to remain for a minute so that Experimenter 2 could make certain it was complete. As he was doing so, the telephone rang. (A concealed tape recorder and voltage amplifier fed a bell and voice signal to the telephone. When Experimenter 2 reached the point in his procedure at which the phone call was desired, he depressed a concealed foot switch. This initiated the ring, and Experimenter 2 lifted the receiver to receive the voice track.) From the conversation, subjects could gather that a friend of Experimenter 2's was sick in the infirmary and that Experimenter 2 would consequently have to do something alone. After the phone call, Experimenter 2 continued to check over the questionnaire, mentioning to subjects that "that guy was supposed to hand out leaflets with me about a TV show on air pollution, but he can't make it." Something in the questionnaire then caught Experimenter 2's eye and he said: "Hmm . . . I see you checked the one here that says 'something can and should be done to control air pollution in our cities.'" Growing more enthusiastic, he said, I have half an hour before my next subject might be coming, and I'm going over to supermarket on street right now for IS or 20 minutes to hand out some of these leaflets.
[Experimenter 2 gets up and walks to a stack of leaflets behind him.] Maybe you'd be interested in coming with me to hand out some of them? I'm only asking you because you did say something should be done about air pollution. Do you want to do it?
Behavioral commitment measure. The main dependent measure was the subject's response to Experimenter 2's request that he join him in handing out leaflets to publicize a television program on air pollution. Subjects had been scheduled so as to maximize the likelihood that they would have time to do this if they wished, and they were led to believe that an affirmative response would commit them to going immediately to a supermarket with Experimenter 2 to hand out the leaflets.
The issue of air pollution was chosen on the assumption that all subjects would agree that some-L. A. McAETHUE, C. A. KlESLER, AND B, P. COOK thing should be done to control it. Theoretically, any issue upon which subjects could be expected to have a fairly uniform opinion would have served to elicit the volunteering behavior. It was only necessary that subjects could be asked to perform some behavior because they held a certain attitude. In the present design, to insure that Experimenter 2 could cite the subject's attitude as a basis for rerequesting that he volunteer, the public opinion survey contained an engineered forced-choice item on which subjects had to check either "something can and should be done to control air pollution" or "nothing at all can be clone to reduce air pollution." As expected, all subjects chose the former.
Debriefing. Immediately following the dependent measure, subjects were thoroughly debriefed. They were first questioned to ascertain possible suspicion and to determine their perception of the experimental manipulations. The hypotheses and manipulations involved in the experiment were then explained by Experimenter 2 who revealed all deceptions. Subjects were pledged to maintain secrecy as to the true nature of the experiment in order to prevent contamination of future subjects.
RESULTS

Effects of the Experimental Manipulations
The check on the payment manipulation contained in the experimental evaluation questionnaire revealed that all subjects knew the level of "outcome" they were to receive. However, the check on the feedback manipulation indicated that seven subjects misunderstood the "input" upon which their outcome was contingent. Five of these seven subjects did demonstrate full understanding of the relevant input when they were questioned by Experimenter 2 at the onset of debriefing. These were retained in the final analysis, and the remaining two subjects were omitted.
Subjects gave their reactions to the payment promised them on a scale ranging from "far too little" to "far too much." A Feed- back X Payment analysis of variance performed on these ratings yielded a significant main effect for payment conditions (F = S8.23, df = 1/54, p < .001), reflecting greater perceived overpayment for high-than low-payment subjects. Feedback had no significant effect on the payment ratings (F -1.01, df = 1/54, #<.2S).
The experimental evaluation questionnaire contained three scales which tapped subjects' mood and interest in the experiment. Two of these scales were highly correlated (r -.68, p < .01). Therefore subjects' ratings on them were summed and a Feedback X Payment analysis of variance was performed on the totals. No significant effects were obtained for this combined measure or for subjects' ratings of how informative they found the experiment (each# > .10).
Dependent Measure
The proportion of subjects volunteering to pass out leaflets in each experimental condition is presented in Table 1 . An arc sine transformation was performed on these proportions for all data analyses.
Since ND-NI and D-NI groups did not differ from one another (all Fs < 1), they were combined to form an overall control condition and a 2 X 2 (Feedback X Payment) analysis of variance was computed. This analysis yielded a significant main effect for feedback (F = 10.39, rf/=l/cc, £<.01), reflecting a higher level of volunteering among D-I subjects than among the combined controls. A significant main effect for payment (F = 4.38, dj = 1/cc, p < .05) reflected a higher proportion of volunteers among highthan low-payment subjects. The Feedback X Payment interaction was not significant (F <1). DISCUSSION In the present study, subjects paid for being doers, as compared with those paid for their task performance, were more likely to comply with a subsequent request to act on an expressed attitude. Telling subjects that they were doers, while paying them for their task performance, did not increase the probability of acting on an attitude over that exhibited by subjects who were merely paid for their task performance. Hence, the selfpercept manipulation in and of itself was not sufficient to augment action on an attitude; rather the motivational force of inequity was a necessary addition.
Although the predicted Feedback X Payment interaction was not obtained, it should be noted that the unexpectedly high proportion of volunteers in the control cells and the concomitant ceiling effect in the D-I highpayment cell may have precluded it. Fisher's exact test was employed to determine the effect of payment within feedback conditions. While there was clearly no significant difference between high-and low-payment control subjects (p > .26, one-tailed), the difference between D-I high-and low-payment subjects approached significance (p = .10, one-tailed) and largely accounts for the payment main effect. The D-I payment effect, although marginal, becomes more impressive when one considers that it represents a difference between high inequity and low, rather than no, inequity. Yale subjects promised even $1.50 in addition to experimental credit would experience some degree of inequity since the accepted policy is to give only experimental credit. Hence, in two respects, the experimental design does not allow a sensitive test of the interaction. First, the dependent measure resulted in a ceiling effect; and, second, the manipulation of low inequity provides a very stringent test of the interaction, since the psychological distance between $1.50 and $10's worth of inequity may in fact be quite small.
While the present study was an implementation of inequity theory rather than a direct test of it, the data are quite consistent with the theory and lend some support to heretofore untested assumptions. Paying subjects for being doers apparently produced inequity, since these subjects were the most likely to increase relevant inputs by acting on an attitude. This finding lends credence to Adams' (1965) assumption that if the possessor of an attribute (such as a doer personality) does not recognize its existence, then it cannot count as an input. The fact that subjects were never explicitly told that their outcomes did or did not exceed their inputs suggests that there : d,o indeed exist normative expectations of what constitute fair relationships between outcomes and inputs.
Since there were no differences between conditions in subjects' reported mood, interest in the experiment, or knowledge gained from participation, these factors do not allow an alternative explanation for the data. Neither do demand characteristics, since the experimenter who obtained the dependent measure was blind to subjects' experimental condition. Experimenter bias effects for the payment variable were ruled out by design, since this information was conveyed to subjects through written instruction. (However, a few subjects did mention the amount of payment they were to receive in questions directed to Experimenter 1.)
A follow-up questionnaire was used to divide subjects into two groups-those who had a past history of activism and those who did not. "Activists" and "nonactivists" were equally represented in each experimental condition, which indicates that "nonrandom" assignment of subjects was not responsible for the obtained effects. Furthermore, separate analyses of the two natural groups suggested even stronger predicted effects for the "nonactivists" than for the "activists." This is not surprising in view of the fact that the inequity manipulation should have been most effective for those subjects who did not recognize doer personality traits as an input they possessed-that is, for the nonactivists. But the reduced sample size in these analyses makes it difficult to interpret the data with confidence. Freedman and Fraser (1966) found that compliance with a request to take action on some issue increased the likelihood that individuals would subsequently comply with a request to take more substantial action on another issue. In attempting to explain these data, the authors suggested that a change in self-perception may have been an intervening variable. In the present study, this explanation was represented as a two-stage process (See Figure 1) in which feedback from behavior influences self-percept which in turn affects the tendency to act on one's attitudes. The second phase of this two-way relationship was tested by direct manipulation of a doer self-percept via feedback from the experimenter. The possibility that some motivation may be created in the genesis of self-percept via action on an attitude led to manipulation of a motivational variable-inequity-to produce an activated doer self-percept for one group of subjects. The results support the proposed relationship between attitude, selfpercept, and behavior. Subjects given false personality feedback informing them that they were doers and motivated, via inequity, to behave consistently with this self-percept were more likely than control subjects to comply with a request that they act on their attitudes toward air pollution by distributing anti-air-pollution leaflets. The present investigation has thus identified one set of conditions under which people show an increased tendency to act on their attitudes. Having demonstrated that an activated self-percept can operate, as an intervening variable, to strengthen the relationship between attitude and behavior, the conditions under which action on an attitude will produce a dynamic doer self-percept remain to be determined.
